Installation of SAP landscapes, transport management systems, etc
The typical tasks of system support and administration of an SAP landscape, regardless of whether it is 2-tier or multi-level, include the following
If this parameter is exceeded by a process, the query is cancelled before it could be executed. Both parameters are limited by the parameter abap/heap_area_total. Of course, there are several other storage parameters that would exceed the scope of this article. You can read their function in the SAP documentation.
As we explained in SAP Basis, your SAP Basis administrator (or team) is directly responsible for keeping your SAP landscape healthy, online, and up-to-date. This includes:
Analysis
In general, SAP operations and all associated activities need to be further professionalised. This includes the documentation of key and mission critical processes and their verification for timeliness and validity. It is also necessary to record and describe the performance of the base by IT service management, as well as techniques such as a RACI matrix to identify and document the responsibilities of the SAP basis.
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
"Shortcut for SAP Systems" makes it easier and quicker to complete a number of SAP basis tasks.
If SRC cannot communicate directly with TRG, but both with PRX it would be possible to use the gateway of the PRX system as a proxy server, i.e. to communicate via it.
On www.sap-corner.de you will also find useful information about SAP basis.
If you are playing with the default scenario, you must immediately perform the comparison of Dictionary objects (transaction SPDD), whereas when you compare Repository objects (transaction SPAU), you have the choice to skip it first and perform it later (modification comparison [page 22]).